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In recent years, there has been growing interest in whether
pre-packed bankruptcy can be a mechanism through
which firms facing imminent insolvency can preserve
value. Although an extensive body of literature exists on
“pre-packs,” whether such techniques really preserve
value remains ambiguous. By analysing bankruptcy pro-
ceedings filed with Dutch courts in the period 2012–2018
through the lenses of real options and debt overhang the-
ory, we examined employment retention postbankruptcy
as a consequence of the type of bankruptcy proceeding
(pre-packed bankruptcy and conventional bankruptcy) and
the severity of prebankruptcy financial distress. The
results show that in the Netherlands, a pre-packed bank-
ruptcy, when compared with a conventional bankruptcy
proceeding, positively impacts employment retention rates
after bankruptcy. The severity of financial distress before
bankruptcy does not affect employment retention rates
postbankruptcy. This implies that despite the amount of
resource slack, the preservation of employee value is bet-
ter served under a pre-packed bankruptcy than a conven-
tional bankruptcy proceeding. This finding is important
for insolvency practice, as up to 22 June 2017, employee
rights in the Netherlands (including redundancy) were not
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considered to be automatically transferred to the firm
acquiring the bankrupt debtor's assets when a pre-packed
bankruptcy was applied. Implications for insolvency regu-
lation and practice are discussed.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Firms that find themselves in dire circumstances can improve their situation by proactively
implementing strategic change to stem survival-threatening performance decline.1 Asset res-
tructuring, as one of four common restructuring strategies,2 is a way to initiate strategic change and
to respond to imminent threats and opportunities in the business environment.3 However, exit bar-
riers can arise when (firm-)specific assets are difficult to trade or transfer or have environmental con-
cerns or other attributes that hinder a fair valuation. If this is the case, firms may have difficulty
implementing strategic change without experiencing value-destroying disruptions to their opera-
tions.4 For these firms, strategically filing for a bankruptcy proceeding can provide a mechanism to
renegotiate unfavourable relationships with stakeholders, possibly due to unforeseen and uncontrolla-
ble events in the external environment. This will reduce transaction costs in cases where contract pro-
visions do not allow firms to renegotiate when unforeseen events occur.5
In the strategic management literature, these filings for a type of bankruptcy proceeding are
referred to as “strategic bankruptcy,” which refers to the use of bankruptcy as a mechanism to enable
firms to implement strategic changes to relationships with customers, suppliers, or other stakeholders
in a manner that positively alters the firms' likelihood of sustainable performance improvements and
survival. A common element found in the literature on “strategic bankruptcies” is the perception that
they are pursued to deal with a single problem, such as high-cost long-term leases. Moreover, as
Moulton and Thomas report, firms that file for a bankruptcy proceeding to resolve a single strategic
1See, e.g., Kathryn Harrigan and Michael Porter, “End-Game Strategies for Declining Industries” (1983) 61 Harvard Business
Review 111; Dominic Lim et al., “Rethinking the Effectiveness of Asset and Cost Retrenchment: The Contingency Effects of a
Firm's Rent Creation Mechanism” (2013) 34 Strategic Management Journal 42; Rick Aalbers, “Rewiring the Intrafirm
Network Under Downsizing: The Role of Tie Loss on Discretionary Tie Formation” (2018) Long Range Planning
(forthcoming); Bert Morrow Jr, Richard Johnson and Lowell Busenitz, “The Effects of Cost and Asset Retrenchment on Firm
Performance: The Overlooked Role of a Firm's Competitive Environment” (2004) 30 Journal of Management Studies 189;
Hugh O'Neill, “An Analysis of the Turnaround Strategy in Commercial Banking” (1986) 23 Journal of Management Studies
165.
2Jim Lai and Sudi Sudarsanam, “Corporate Restructuring in Response to Performance Decline: Impact of Ownership,
Governance and Lenders” (1997) 1 European Finance Review 197.
3See, e.g., Irene Duhaime and John Grant, “Factors Influencing Divestment Decision-Making: Evidence from a Field Study”
(1984) 5 Strategic Management Journal 301; Michael Hitt, Jeffery Harrison and Duane Ireland, Mergers and Acquisitions: A
Guide to Creating Value for Stakeholders (Oxford University Press, 2001); Robert Hoskisson and Michael Hitt,
Downscoping: How to Tame the Diversified Firm (Oxford University Press, 1994); Constantinos Markides, “Consequences of
Corporate Refocusing: Ex ante Evidence” (1992) 35 Academy of Management Journal 398.
4Sharon James, “Strategic Bankruptcy: A Stakeholder Management Perspective” (2016) 69 Journal of Business Research 492.
5See Oliver Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations” (1979) 22 Journal of Law
and Economics 233; Oliver Williamson, “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural
Alternatives” (1991) 36 Administrative Science Quarterly 269.
6Wilbur Moulton and Howard Thomas, “Bankruptcy as a Deliberate Strategy: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical
Evidence” (1993) 14 Strategic Management Journal 125.
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problem tend to face a similar level of difficulty when reorganizing to those suffering more general
(complex) corporate distress.6 Moreover, “strategic bankruptcy” is usually only pursued as a last
resort after exploring all out-of-court options.7 As the downward-spiral decline literature suggests,
when a firm's decline is left unchecked, performance worsens over time and tends to become self-
reinforcing, further depleting a firm's resource slack.8 However, whereas bankruptcy may be consid-
ered a last resort, it can also prove a bridge over troubled water. This is the core thesis of strategic
bankruptcy: Financially distressed firms are enabled to restructure and adapt to their changing envi-
ronments through a bankruptcy proceeding, while at the same time limiting bankruptcy costs and
public scrutiny. Therefore, a “strategic bankruptcy” is expected to preserve firm value and, not uni-
mportantly from a theoretical strategic management perspective, retain the firm's employment and
other key (intellectual) resources.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the management literature on whether “strate-
gic bankruptcy” can be a mechanism through which firms can restructure in order to preserve and
enhance value for the stakeholders. Previously, this literature perceived bankruptcy mostly as a pro-
cedure focused on liquidation and dissolution of the legal entity, an end-of-the-line approach.9 Legis-
lators and practitioners have, however, in recent years pursued new or revised approaches to legal
frameworks facilitating corporate restructuring, also within bankruptcy proceedings. This includes
the pre-packaging of a sale of the business before bankruptcy but also facilitating going-concern sales
postbankruptcy by the liquidator.10 These (legislative) developments are driven by a desire to pro-
mote efficient insolvency frameworks.11 As such, the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings has
7Also see David Flynn and Mamidouh Farid, “The Intentional Use of Chapter XI: Lingering Versus Immediate Filing” (1993)
12 Strategic Management Journal 63.
8See, e.g., Donald Hambrick and Richard D'Aveni, “Large Corporate Failures as Downward Spirals” (1988) 33 Administrative
Science Quarterly 1; William McKinley, Scott Latham and Michael Braun, “Organizational Decline and Innovation:
Turnarounds and Downward Spirals” (2014) 39 Academy of Management Review 88; Jenny Rudolph and Nelson Repenning,
“Disaster Dynamics: Understanding the Role of Quantity in Organizational Collapse” (2002) 47 Administrative Science
Quarterly 1; William Weitzel and Ellen Jonsson, “Decline in Organizations: A Literature Intergration and Extension” (1989)
34 Administrative Science Quarterly 91.
9Harlan Platt and Marjorie Platt, “Corporate Board Attributes and Bankruptcy” (2012) 65 Journal of Business Research 1139.
10See, for the Netherlands, for instance, Nico Tollenaar, “Faillissementsrechters van Nederland: Geef Ons de Prepack” TvI
2011/23 and the legislative proposal Wet continuïteit ondernemingen I (Business continuation act I) providing a legal basis for
the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy, see Kamerstukken I 2015/16, 34 218, A. See also the draft legislative proposal Wet
overgang van onderneming in faillissement (Act on transfer of business in bankruptcy) (29 May 2019), available at: <www.
rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/05/29/ek-bijlage-3-voorstel-van-wet-inzake-wet-overgang-van-onderneming-in-
faillissement>. This proposal deals with matters regarding employees in a transfer of undertaking that takes place in a
bankruptcy procedure.
11See, for instance, the EU legislator in its efforts since 2012 towards the Directive EU 2019/1023 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and
disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning restructuring, insolvency and
discharge of debt, and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 (EU Directive on restructuring and insolvency), recitals 16 and
29, and Article 1(c) (EU Directive on restructuring and insolvency). See also Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, A new European approach to
business failure and insolvency, 12.12.2012, COM(2012) 742 final, at 2.; Commission Recommendation on a new
approach to business failure and insolvency, 12 March 2014, C(2014) 1500 final, recitals 11 and 12, and at 1;
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, 30.09.2015, COM(2015)
468 final, at 6.2. For the Netherlands, this was clearly voiced by Tollenaar, above note 10. Compare Jan van Apeldoorn,
“Pre-packs” TvI 2012/17 for some critical observations.
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become topic of debate, both in academia and practice. For example, management research on bank-
ruptcy costs has shown that a streamlined (bankruptcy) reorganization process contributes to improv-
ing the selection of viable firms.12 But whether this streamlining also preserves firm value by
retaining employment for the firm has not yet been the subject of empirical investigation.
In this article, we contribute to this literature on streamlining the bankruptcy process. Using a stra-
tegic management research perspective, we focus on the retention rates of employment in two
reorganization-driven scenarios, analysing whether a pre-packed bankruptcy is more efficient and
effective in preserving value for employees in terms of employment retention than in a conventional
going-concern sale bankruptcy proceeding. As to the specific research context, we selected cases
from the Dutch insolvency practice between 2012 and 2018.
For bankruptcy proceedings, formal and collective proceedings directed at the liquidation of the
debtor are administered by a liquidator (curator).13 In practice, the liquidator in bankruptcy will pursue a
(partial) going-concern sale where the company is perceived to be still (partly) viable and where this is
in the best interest of the creditors.14 The Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy practice emerged in 2012 but
declined quickly after the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) gave its judgement in the so-
called Smallsteps case, mid-2017.15 The rise in pre-packed bankruptcy also relates to the absence of
effective informal restructuring tools in the Dutch insolvency framework.16 In the preliminary phase,
before filing for opening a formal bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor may request the court to appoint a
provisional liquidator (in Dutch: beoogd curator) and a provisional supervisory judge (in Dutch: beoogd
rechter-commissaris), while preparing a deal for an asset sale to be performed postbankruptcy.17 Most
of the preparations before filing for bankruptcy are conducted informally and not usually made public.
The pre-packed bankruptcy has been developed in practice; however, not all Dutch courts allow
for pre-packs as it lacks a formal statutory basis. Other critiques were raised, including that the pre-
packed bankruptcy lacks transparency (for all affected parties),18 distorts market competition,19 may
limit objectivity of the liquidator,20 and, at that time, possible incompatibility with the European
Union (EU) Transfer of Undertakings Directive (TOU Directive).21 Currently, a legislative reform is
12See, for instance, Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch and Ning Zhu, “The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus
Chapter 11 Reorganization” (2006) 61 The Journal of Finance 1253; Xavier Giné and Inessa Love, “Do Reorganization Costs
Matter for Efficiency? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Colombia” (2010) 53(4) Journal of Law and Economics 833.
For an overview of the debate in Dutch legal literature, see Frank Verstijlen, “Reorganisatie van Ondernemingen en Pre-Pack,”
in Danny Busch et al. (eds), Wet Continuïteit Ondernemingen (Delen I en II) en het Bestuursverbod (Paris BV, 2014).
13Articles 20, 23, and 68, Dutch Bankruptcy Act.
14David Ehmke et al., “The EU Preventive Restructuring Framework: A Hole in One?” (2019) 28(2) International Insolvency
Review 184, Sections 3.4 and 4.
15Tollenaar, above note 10; Marc van Zanten, “It Takes Smallsteps to Pre-Pack” in Ewert Verwey, Michael Broeders and Flip
Schreurs (eds), De Curator en het Personeel (Insolad Jaarboek 2018) (Wolters Kluwer, 2018).
16Karin Luttikhuis, “De Slagkracht van de Informele Reorganisatie” TvI 2008/22. Prior empirical research already showed
that, for the Dutch context, informal reorganisation had benefits, such as confidentiality, flexibility and low costs of informal
restructuring proceedings, see Jan Adriaanse and Hans Kuijl, “Informele Reorganisatie” TvI 2004/65.
17See further on the legal framework of the Dutch pre-pack: Steffie van den Bosch, “De Pre-Pack in de Nederlandse Praktijk:
Een Empirisch Onderzoek Vanuit Economisch Perspectief” TvOB, 2018/4.
18Van Apeldoorn, above note 11.
19Marten van Vugt, “De Nederlandse Pre-Pack: Time-Out, Please!” FIP 2014/47, 26-28.
20Bruno Tideman, “Kritische Kanttekeningen bij de Pre-Pack” FIP 2013/6, 192.
21Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses, or parts of undertakings or businesses.
Critiques of noncompatibility of the pre-packed bankruptcy with this Directive were raised, for instance, by E. Loesberg,
“Heiligt het doel de middelen? Pre-pack in het Nederlandse faillissementsrecht” TOP 2013/1, p. 31; Pam Hufman and Ilse
Zaal, “De toepasselijkheid van de Richtlijn overgang van onderneming bij insolvente ondernemingen” TAP 2014/98, 169.
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pending to introduce legislation to formalize the pre-packed bankruptcy.22 Initially, it was considered
that the protection for employees as provided for in the TOU Directive was not applicable, because
the Netherlands implemented the exception provided in Article 5(1) of the TOU Directive.23 This is
different from, for instance, the United Kingdom, where employee protection is also applicable to
pre-pack sales.24 However, in 2017, the Dutch approach changed when the CJEU gave its prelimi-
nary ruling in the Smallsteps case, deciding—in short—that the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy was
not considered a proceeding instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor.25
As a consequence, the employee protection of the TOU Directive is applicable in a transfer of busi-
ness in a pre-packed bankruptcy.26
The Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy is thus somewhat unique, and our study merely intends to draw
attention to a relevant case setting in which employee rights were not (presumed to be) automatically
transferred to the transferee upon the transfer of the business, both in the pre-packed bankruptcy and
in the conventional bankruptcy proceeding.27 Rescue of the business, in this specific case, was per-
formed with a pre-packed bankruptcy due to lack of a formal or hybrid rescue proceeding. This
should not directly be compared with—for example—the U.K. pre-packs that are an actual instance
of the rescue processes within Administration that aims to preserve going-concern value. In the
U.K. approach, the feasibility of pre-packs is also under debate, in particular about whether the pro-
tections built into the system for the less sophisticated stakeholders suffice.28
In our case study context, however, analysing the Dutch experience with a pre-packed bank-
ruptcy, the research question is primarily of a descriptive nature: Do reorganization-driven scenarios
of the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy preserve more firm value than those in a conventional going-
concern sale bankruptcy proceeding? As such, we unpack the notion of restructuring as an instance
of “strategic bankruptcy,” drawing from an existing theoretical body of knowledge in the strategic
management literature and backing up our descriptive analysis by a unique set of empirical data col-
lected from the pre-pack rulings over the past years in the Netherlands. Insights from this article
thereby aspire to contribute to the discussion on bankruptcy as a mechanism for strategic change and
the type of bankruptcy proceeding that best serves that change. From a strategic management
research literature perspective, we thus seek to contribute to the bankruptcy mechanism itself.
This article is organized as follows. First, we explain how the strategic management literature
conceptualizes bankruptcy as a strategic action rather than an end-of-the-line event. Guided by debt
overhang theory and real options theory, we explain why bankruptcy is used strategically as a mecha-
nism to restructure a firm and subsequently emerge as a going concern, irrespective of the chosen
22See the legislative proposal for the Wet continuïteit ondernemingen I (Business continuation act I), available at: <https://
www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34218_wet_continuiteit>.
23Article 5(1), TOU Directive is implemented in Article 7:666, Dutch Civil Code.
24See, for an elaborate comparison of the pre-pack in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, Alexandra Kastrinou and Stef
Vullings, “‘No Evil is Without Good’: A Comparative Analysis of Pre-Pack Sales in the UK and the Netherlands” (2018)
27(3) International Insolvency Review 320, Section VIII.
25Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 22 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:489 (FNV/Smallsteps). The CJEU followed
the Opinion of AG Mengozzi, CJEU 29 March 2017, EU:C:2017:241.
26This was later confirmed by the CJEU in the Plessers case on a Belgium pre-pack. See CJEU 16 May 2019, ECLI:EU:
C:2019:424. That there is only limited room for the exception provided in Article 5(1) of the TOU Directive was recently
concluded in the opinion of AG Drijber of 1 November 2019 in the Heijploeg case, a case that is pending with the Dutch
Supreme Court (to be published).
27See Kastrinou and Vullings, above note 24, Section II.
28ibid., Section III. See also Teresa Graham, Graham Review into Pre-Pack Administration (Report to the Rt. Hon Vince
Cable MP) (June 2014), available at:<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/317438/Graham_review_report_-_June2014final.docx>.
AALBERS ET AL.324
type of (i.e., pre-packed or conventional) bankruptcy proceeding. Second, we describe and justify the
empirical methodology applied in this study and present the statistical results. Finally, we discuss the
findings and their implications for insolvency regulation and practice.
2 | THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In our study, we define organizational decline as “a condition in which a substantial, absolute
decrease in an organisation's resource base occurs over a specified period of time.”29 Financial dis-
tress is defined as the state in which the liquid assets of the firm are not sufficient to meet the current
(contractual) obligations.30 In this context, retrenchment is defined as efficiency-oriented, short-term
turnaround actions such as downsizing, cost reduction, asset sell-offs, and the divestment of busi-
nesses that aim to stem survival-threatening performance decline.31 Mechanisms for resolving finan-
cial distress aim to address the mismatch between the firm and its environment by restructuring the
assets, restructuring the financing contracts, or both.32
Although retrenchment strategies have been approached in the strategic management literature
from multiple theoretical perspectives,33 real options theory and debt overhang theory stand out as
the frameworks most commonly applied to the study of strategic decision making under the condition
of organizational decline. Combining these two theoretical lenses emphasizes the inherent value of
flexibility as well as acknowledges the associated managerial cognitive strain that commands turn-
around management operations.34
In the following section, we discuss first debt overhang theory and real options theory as a theo-
retical framework describing mechanisms to resolve financial distress following organizational
decline. Next, we discuss the strategic management context of financial distress. This focuses, partic-
ularly, on the proactive use of bankruptcy mechanisms to restructure in an attempt to resolve finan-
cial distress and regain viability. The procedure of pre-packed bankruptcy, as a strategic alternative
to the conventional bankruptcy proceeding in the Netherlands, is then interpreted through the com-
bined theoretical lenses of debt overhang theory and real options theory. We focus our discussion on
29Kim Cameron, Myung Kim and David Whetten, “Organizational Effects of Decline and Turbulence” (1987)
32 Administrative Science Quarterly 222.
30Edith Hotchkiss et al., “Bankruptcy and the Resolution of Financial Distress” in B. Espen Eckbo (ed), Handbook of
Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance (Vol 2) (Elsevier, 2008); Matthias Kahl, “Economic Distress, Financial
Distress, and Dynamic Liquidation” (2002) 57 The Journal of Finance 135.
31Lim et al., above note 1; Morrow, Johnson and Busenitz, above note 1; O'Neill, above note 1.
32Hotchkiss et al., above note 29.
33See, e.g., James Guthrie and Deepak Datta, “Dumb and Dumber: The Impact of Downsizing on Firm Performance as
Moderated by Industry Conditions” (2008) 19 Organization Science 108; Chanchai Tangpong, Michael Abebe and Zonghui
Li, “A Temporal Approach to Retrenchment and Successful Turnaround in Declining Firms” (2015) 52 Journal of
Management Studies 647; Rick Aalbers and Wilfred Dolfsma, “Resilience of Information Flow During Restructuring:
Characterizing Information Value Being Exchanged and the Structure of a Network Under Turmoil” (2019) 100 Journal of
Business Research 299.
34See, e.g., Xavier Giroud et al., “Snow and Leverage” (2012) 25 Review of Financial Studies 680; Luigi Guiso, Paola
Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, Time Varying Risk Aversion (Northwestern University, 2011); Jingoo Kang, Ribuga Kang and
Sang-Joon Kim, “An Empirical Examination of Vacillation Theory” (2016) 38 Strategic Management Journal 1356; Ronald
Klingebiel and Ron Adner, “Real Options Logic Revisited: The Performance Effects of Alternative Resource Allocation
Regimes” (2015) 58 Academy of Management Journal 221; Brian Melzer, Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by
Homeowners with Negative Equity (Northwestern University, 2010); Stewart Myers, “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”
(1977) 5 Journal of Financial Economics 147; Lenos Trigeorgis and Jeffrey Reuer, “Real Options Theory in Strategic
Management” (2016) 38 Strategic Management Journal 42.
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elements of both strategic bankruptcy and financial distress in relation to the retention of employees
in bankruptcy.35
2.1 | Debt overhang and real options theory
Debt overhang (or being over the firm's debt capacity) is often used by banks as a rationale for credit
rationing.36 Tirole states that firms experience debt overhang when they are unable to raise new
financing for a profitable project.37 This occurs when a firm's future income and fixed assets have
been forfeited and the firm is unable to restructure its debt with existing creditors in the form of a
haircut or by renegotiating the debt's package of terms and conditions (e.g., interest and payment
scheme). Debt overhang has serious implications for a firm's future. In financially constrained firms,
an increase in leverage will increase a firm's likelihood to default.38
Debt overhang is known to affect managerial behaviour, skewing rational decision making. In a
seminal article, Myers argues that managers in a firm with risky outstanding debt and a focus on
maximizing equity value are incentivized to defer investing, resulting in inefficient investment
behaviour.39 When investigating external financing rationale, Hennessy and Whited found that debt
overhang reduces the level of investment by approximately 1% to 2% for each percent increase in the
leverage ratio of long-term debt to assets.40 Debt overhang was also found to negatively affect
employment growth and capital expenditure growth.41 Moreover, Giroud et al. found that debt over-
hang impairs firm performance and that a decrease in leverage leads to a significant increase in
Return on Assets.42 The increase in Return on Assets is caused by a decrease in overhead costs and
wages and an increase in sales. Moreover, when looking at the impact of firm size on this phenome-
non, research suggests that larger firms tend to experience a smaller impact of leverage changes on
operating performance fluctuations than smaller firms.43
In a different setting, Hackbarth focused on behavioural perspectives at managerial level and
found that managerial biases can impact financing and investment decisions.44 The combination of
managerial optimism and overconfidence in managers that try to maximize the value of equity affects
their decision making inasmuch that biased managers choose higher debt levels and invest earlier
than rational managers.45 Giroud et al. illustrated how debt overhang can further distort incentives.
For example, owners of debt-ridden firms may intentionally forego crucial investments
(e.g., maintenance of plant and equipment), exert too little effort (e.g., effort devoted to marketing,
35See, e.g., Giroud et al., above note 33; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, above note 33; Kang, Kang and Sang-Joon, above note
33; Melzer, above note 33; Myers, above note 33; Trigeorgis and Reuer, above note 33.
36Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information” (1981) 71 The American
Economic Review 393.
37Jean Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 2010).
38Jie Cai and Zhe Zhang, “Leverage Change, Debt Overhang, and Stock Prices” (2011) 17 Journal of Corporate Finance 391.
39Myers, above note 33.
40Christopher Hennessy and Toni Whited, “How Costly Is External Financing? Evidence From a Structural Estimation”
(2007) 62 The Journal of Finance 1705.
41Larry Lang, Eli Ofek and Rene Stulz, “Leverage, Investment, and Firm Growth” (1996) 40 Journal of Financial Economics
3.
42Giroud et al., above note 33.
43Chaiporn Vithessonthi and Jittima Tongurai, “The Effect of Firm Size on the Leverage–Performance Relationship During
the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009” (2015) 29 Journal of Multinational Financial Management 1.




sales, cost-cutting, and improving efficiency), strategically pay out cash to themselves (as wages of
dividends), or sell vital assets on the secondary market and pocket the proceeds.46 In extreme cases,
debt overhang can distort a firm's management and lead to strategic defaulting.
At the core of the phenomenon of strategically opting for a bankruptcy proceeding lies the following
reasoning. A financially distressed firm heading for failure is trapped in an unchecked downward spiral
of organizational decline. In this situation, a firm's slack financial, human, and reputational resources are
depleted due to incurred losses. As slack financial resources diminish along the downward spiral, so do
the options and opportunities for strategic change.47 As discussed, debt overhang has financial and
behavioural consequences. In a state of financial distress and debt overhang, management incentives
may be distorted: crucial investments may be foregone, and exerted effort can perish.48 This situation
can lead to managerial paralysis, as managers' priorities shift from serving the firm's interests to their
own interests. At the same time, the classical notion of debt overhang affects the firm as it is unable to
arrange additional funds (neither equity nor debt) to carry the necessary restructuring costs. When this
state is reached, strategically filing for bankruptcy becomes a real option that can still be called
on. Myers coined the term real options and envisioned bringing the theory of financial options to the
realm of strategic decision making.49 An option is a right, but no obligation, to take some future speci-
fied action at a predetermined cost. Originating from finance, these options are commonly used as a mea-
sure to hedge risk in the face of high stock, bond, or commodity market volatility. At the core, however,
lies a fundamental decision asymmetry to take a future decision (e.g., invest, divest, or restructure) only
if this is beneficial to the decision maker.50 Trigeorgis and Reuer state that this asymmetry of options—
involving the right but not the obligation to act—also gives rise to an asymmetry in firm outcomes in the
presence of uncertainty.51 Applying this to a reorganization-driven scenario, firms that have an option to
restructure using a bankruptcy proceeding should have a greater chance of survival than firms lacking
this option. Real options reasoning, moreover, suggests for more of the defaulting firm's possible bene-
fits to be captured and the most egregious of its costs to be contained.52
Through the real options lens, a distressed firm's strategic choice for bankruptcy may be under-
stood as a real option. First, a “strategic bankruptcy” involves both direct and indirect costs from not
choosing alternative courses of action such as selling the (unprofitable) businesses (i.e., divestment),
avoiding deterioration by restructuring in a timely fashion (i.e., employee layoffs and strategic
refocusing), and negotiating debt with its creditors (i.e., out-of-court settlement).53 Second, if the
firm can be successfully reorganized through “strategic bankruptcy,” the gain from upside variance
can be unlimited, whereas the costs are limited. Third, the management of the firm is free to either
exercise or abandon the option depending on developments in its situation. For example, in case the
variances of alternative options become more favourable for the firm, the firm's management is free
to abandon the “strategic bankruptcy” without any obligations. Additionally, in the real options per-
spective, a firm's real assets investments in the preparation of the “strategic bankruptcy” can be
46Giroud et al., above note 33; Myers, above note 33.
47Vincent Barker and Irene Duhaime, “Strategic Change in the Turnaround Process: Theory and Empirical Evidence” (1997)
18 Strategic Management Journal 13.
48Giroud et al., above note 33.
49See Trigeorgis and Reuer, above note 33.
50idem.
51idem.
52Rita McGrath, “Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and Entrepreneurial Failure” (1999) 24 Academy of Management
Review 13.
53See Rick Aalbers et al., “Relevantie van Transparantie” M&A Community (11 July 2014); Kang, Kang and Kim, above note
33; John Kose, Larry Lang and Jeffrey Netter, “The Voluntary Restructuring of Large Firms in Response to Performance
Decline” (1992) 47 The Journal of Finance 891.
AALBERS ET AL. 327
regarded as parallel to option premiums as found in call options rationale, providing relative flexibil-
ity to the distressed firm.54
Bankruptcy as a strategic real option thus allows the firm to avert definitive failure by proactively
preparing and initiating bankruptcy proceedings. The speed and discretion of the process limits bank-
ruptcy costs and provides time to find new investors to restructure the firm as a going concern. This
prearranged going-concern sale preserves more value for the business than a piecemeal liquidation
that keeps the viable parts intact. Another important factor in this force field of interests and stake-
holder positions is the firm's management. We argue that as the management is incentivized to main-
tain both control and their income, they benefit from a smooth, intact transfer of assets to a new legal
entity as this increases the chances of being able to stay with the firm.
From a real options perspective, the downside variance at the firm level is limited to the bankruptcy
costs.55 As discussed earlier, this involves both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs refer to those asso-
ciated with a firm's bankruptcy filing. These are primarily administrative and include professional fees,
court costs, document preparation, and communication with potential investors and creditors.56 Indirect
costs are opportunity costs such as the impacts of bankruptcy on a firm's reputation and the firm's percep-
tion of sustainability.57 Out-of-court settlements and prebankruptcy restructuring (e.g., renegotiating
lease contracts and employee's wages) provide the fastest resolution of financial distress while diverting
bankruptcy costs, making it the preferable option.58 However, looking through the debt overhang lens,
financial distress can also cause management to exert too little effort and to forego investments.59 How-
ever, it is not only the firm's management that can be blamed for suboptimal decision making, some
creditors may be unwilling to negotiate down outstanding debt before a firm's bankruptcy filing. These
creditors do not recognize the cap on downside risk that these arrangements offer from an eventual bank-
ruptcy filing.60 Bankruptcy generally does not offer a sophisticated mechanism to resolve a firm's finan-
cial distress. Filing for bankruptcy is generally considered to be costly and complicated; a rough remedy
in every respect, and only to be considered as a last resort. Once in bankruptcy, information is limited
and primarily relates to the firm's tangible assets. Potential buyers have little time to analyse the available
information in order to prepare an offer for the firm's assets. The picture painted above illustrates that an
asset sale in bankruptcy is, in every respect, a fire sale. This translates into the value of the bids, which
usually range between break-up value and going-concern value.
2.2 | Bankruptcy as a strategic option
For many years, the organizational decline and turnaround literature viewed bankruptcy as a defini-
tive form of failure and, therefore, considered it only as a firm's last resort.61 Illustrating the strategic
nature of bankruptcy, Moulton and Thomas extended this conceptualization in two ways.62 First,
54Kang, Kang and Kim, above note 33.
55idem.
56Moulton and Thomas, above note 6.
57Robert Sutton and Anita Callahan, “The Stigma of Bankruptcy. Spoiled Organizational Image and its Management” (1987)
30 Academy of Management Review 405; Lawrence Weiss, “Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims” (1990) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 285.
58Julian Franks and Walter Torous, “A Comparison of Financial Recontracting in Distressed Exchanges and Chapter 11
Reorganizations” (1994) 35 Journal of Financial Economics 349.
59Cai and Zhang, above note 37; Giroud et al., above note 33.
60See Michael Jensen and William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; Myers, above note 33.
61Platt and Platt, above note 9.
62Moulton and Thomas, above note 6.
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they found that some firms deliberately use bankruptcy as a strategy within their turnaround process.
Second, they extended the concept of reorganization success by introducing the notion of partial reor-
ganizations, in which a firm divests parts of its assets and is either acquired by another firm or main-
tains its identity.63 The Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy practice fits this extended management concept
of failure as it facilitates a reorganization within bankruptcy, usually achieved by a pre-packaged
going-concern asset sale, in which a firm's issues are resolved without incurring the costs associated
with out-of-bankruptcy solutions such as claims from employees or penalty clauses in lease con-
tracts.64 The pre-packed bankruptcy offers the possibility for the debtor's management to proactively
prepare for and implement strategic change (e.g., in financing structure, assets, and relationships with
the firm's vital stakeholders) in order to preserve firm value and to improve the likelihood of business
continuity. The provisional liquidator has formal powers in this phase.65
In the strategic management literature, a strategic bankruptcy is viewed as a proactive attempt by a
firm's management to contend with a threat posed by a stakeholder group or other external forces.66 In
this context, “strategic bankruptcy” is not merely regarded as the result of organizational decline but also
as a legal mechanism that can be implemented to improve an organization's effectiveness.67 For exam-
ple, the firm's management may initiate a “strategic bankruptcy” to deal with undesirable labour con-
tracts, to avoid claims from a product liability lawsuit, or to avoid sanctions from governmental
institutions.68 From a strategy point of view, bankruptcy then is regarded as a mechanism for strategic
change, reconfiguring a firm's (strategic) resources, competencies, and capabilities, to improve a firm's
performance and long-term viability.69 However, as Moulton and Thomas point out, the question of
whether to accelerate or delay a bankruptcy filing obscures a more fundamental dilemma. Bankruptcy is
no sinecure; it is generally a costly and painful experience.70 Therefore, in the view of the strategic man-
agement literature, a firm will only opt for strategic bankruptcy if the firm's management is convinced
that it is unable to resolve its issues in another way, without incurring severe costs or even penalties.71
A firm can use “strategic bankruptcy” to restructure (a) its liabilities and equity, (b) its assets, and
(c) to reorganize relationships with key stakeholders such as employees, customers, and suppliers.72
Retaining key employees and maintaining relationships with key customers and suppliers are critical
for (future) value-creating activities. The preservation of value in a bankruptcy affects all
63Also see Cheryl Trahms, Hermann Ndofor and David Sirmon, “Organizational Decline and Turnaround a Review and
Agenda for Future Research” (2013) 39 Journal of Management 1277.
64See, e.g., Articles 39 and 40, Dutch Bankruptcy Act.
65Wouter Jongepier and Krijn Hoogenboezem, “Wie is de stille bewindvoerder?” FIP 2013/6, 196. Compare Marc van Zanten,
“De beoogd curator, uitgegroeid van fly on the wall tot spin in het web” TVI 2015/35.
66See, e.g., Richard D'Aveni, “Dependability and Organizational Bankruptcy: An Application of Agency and Prospect
Theory” (1989) 35 Management Science 1120; Catherine Daily and Dan Dalton, “Corporate Governance and the Bankrupt
Firm: An Empirical Assessment” (1994) 15 Strategic Management Journal 643; Kevin Delaney, Strategic Bankruptcy: How
Corporations and Creditors Use Chapter 11 to Their Advantage (University of California Press, 1992); Flynn and Farid,
above note 7; Moulton and Thomas, above note 6.
67Klaus Heine and Heike Rindfleisch, “Organizational Decline: A Synthesis of Insights from Organizational Ecology, Path
Dependence and the Resource-Based View” (2013) 26 Journal of Organizational Change Management 8.
68Daily and Dalton, above note 65; Moulton and Thomas, above note 6.
69See, e.g., Jocelyn Evans and Aberdeen Borders, “Strategically Surviving Bankruptcy During a Global Financial Crisis: The
Importance of Understanding Chapter 15” (2014) 67 Journal of Business Research 2738; Flynn and Farid, above note 7;
James, above note 4; Samina Karim and Will Mitchell, “Path-Dependent and Path-Breaking Change: Reconfiguring Business
Resources Following Acquisitions in the US Medical Sector, 1978-1995” (2000) 21 Strategic Management Journal 1061.
70Moulton and Thomas, above note 6.
71James, above note 4.
72Stuart Gilson, Creating Value Through Corporate Restructuring: Case Studies in Bankruptcies, Buyouts, and Breakups
(Wiley, 2001).
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stakeholders, either via the proceeds from the sale of a debtor's assets or via the value preservation
inside the firm, thereby increasing the probability of a successful (partial) reorganization. As a firm's
postbankruptcy value and likelihood of long-term success increases, so does the value of assets held
as security for secured creditors while also maintaining key employees, customers, and suppliers
who directly influence firm value.73 This mechanism to ensure economic efficiency under court
supervision, whether under a pre-packed or conventional bankruptcy proceeding, is very similar to
informal restructuring (i.e., turnaround) as it is also aimed at overcoming financial distress, but in a
different institutional (legal) context.74
It should be noted, however, that strategically, bankruptcy is not only used to increase a firm's
economic efficiency as has been flagged in recent public debate by stakeholders such as labour
unions, academics, and European legislators. In the Netherlands, “strategic bankruptcy,” as with pre-
packed bankruptcy, has also been used to avoid legal sanctions from governmental institutions. This
was well-illustrated by the Dutch Heiploeg-group case, a high-calibre case in the Dutch insolvency
practice. In the case of Heiploeg, Europe's leading shrimp supplier with headquarters in the Nether-
lands serving a customer base all over Europe, strategically filing for bankruptcy was primarily used
to reduce threats from and cut certain ties with powerful institutions (in this case, the European Com-
mission) rather than as a mechanism to secure economic efficiency. On 27 November 2013, the
European Commission announced that they would fine Heiploeg EUR 27 million for involvement in
a price fixing cartel. The payment deadline was set for 28 February 2014. Following the announced
European Commission fine, Heiploeg considered pursuing a pre-packed bankruptcy. On 16 January
2014, at Heiploeg's request, the court appointed a provisional liquidator and a provisional supervi-
sory judge to oversee the (further) preparation of the pre-packaged deal. After a period of “silent
(pre-pack) administration,” Heiploeg filed for bankruptcy with the pre-packaged deal to sell the busi-
ness postbankruptcy. On 28 January 2014, Heiploeg was declared bankrupt and restarted its business
in a new legal entity, leaving the sanction with the bankrupt entity.75
In sum, in order to speak of a strategic bankruptcy, certain key elements should be present.
According to Verstijlen, the aspect of court-appointed supervision in the final stage before requesting
the opening of bankruptcy at the request of the distressed firm is key to this.76 There must be evi-
dence that the filing was part of a plan that the firm's managers were unable to execute prepetition
and that the filing was being used as a ploy to force stakeholder support.77 If this is not the case, the
filing should not be considered strategic but as an end-of-the-line event. Furthermore, a strategic
bankruptcy must involve an integral solution for a firm's situation, above and beyond its traditional
creditors; it is not sufficient to only deal with specific issues in order to get court approval. By this,
we mean that the plan must involve and consider all stakeholders, and not just a few.
73James, above note 4.
74See, e.g., Delaney, above note 65; Tobias Eichner, Restructuring and Turnaround of Distressed Manufacturing Firms. An
international Empirical Study (Peter Lang GmbH, 2010).
75District Court Overijssel 28 July 2015, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2015:3589, par. 2.5-2.10. See for more details on the pre-packed
bankruptcy of Heiploeg: van Zanten, above note 15, 31-32; Job van der Pijl, Arbeidsrecht en insolventie: Over de positie van
de werknemer van een insolvente werkgever (Wolters Kluwer, 2019), paragraph 6.4.2. Proceedings are pending whether, in
particular following the Smallsteps-case, the exception of Article 5(1) of the TOU Directive is applicable in the case of
Heiploeg. The recent opinion of the AG Drijber (to be published) in the proceeding pending with the Dutch Supreme Court
concludes that the conditions for the exception are not met in the case of Heiploeg.
76Verstijlen, above note 12.
77Jerry Sheppard, “Beautifully Broken Benches. A Typology of Strategic Bankruptcies and the Opportunities for Positive
Shareholder Returns” (1995) 12 Journal of Business Strategies 99.
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2.3 | Strategic bankruptcy and employee retention
Following real options logic, firms in severe financial distress face high uncertainty. This uncertainty
inherently raises the option value of pre-packed bankruptcy and subsequent successful restructuring
when the management of the distressed firm believes the distress is temporary or conducive to turn-
around.78 High uncertainty about a firm's future viability increases both the direct and indirect costs
of bankruptcy associated with a firm's reputation and perception of sustainability. Subsequently, both
expected earnings and the value of the firm's assets will decrease,79 in turn lowering the real option
flexibility the firm faces. Early studies indicate that executives leaving bankrupt firms do not attain
similar positions for at least 3 years, providing a strong incentive for managers to avoid definitive
failure.80 Employees also suffer postbankruptcy; they tend to bear severe wage losses after their
employer has filed for bankruptcy.81 Broadening the stakeholder field beyond management and cred-
itors towards the labour force, we note interestingly that the effect of bankruptcy type on employment
retention has been little studied. Employee retention refers to the ability to retain employees in any
organization.82 Long-term health and success of any organization depends upon the retention of key
employees, with employees directly affecting prime corporate performance mechanisms such as cus-
tomer satisfaction, sales, and even effective succession planning.83
According to advocates of the pre-packed bankruptcy in the Netherlands,84 strategically, bank-
ruptcy allows a firm to restructure while limiting the ex post costs of bankruptcy that damage the
firm, for example, the bankruptcy stigma proposed by Sutton and Callahan.85 All involved parties—
including a representation of the labour force—have the opportunity to examine and gather sufficient
information while under better circumstances, hidden from the public scrutiny that can delude firm
value as suppliers, financers, and customers may back away from a stigmatized firm. The liquidator
representing the firm and its creditors can have more opportunities to develop real alternatives,
strengthening the bargaining position. The result is that a financially distressed firm can restructure
via a thoroughly and discretely prepared going-concern sale. In doing so, the firm can adapt to its
changing environment while at the same time limiting bankruptcy costs and disintegration damage to
the firm. The loss of sales, the higher cost of credit, and less investment opportunities can thereby be
limited.86 This is reflected in the value of the firm and therefore in the employment retention of the
bankrupt firm. A firm that preserves more value and business opportunities will very likely be better
able to retain its employees, as future prospects for the firm signal continued employment opportu-
nity to the labour force. Thus, a more seamless asset transaction, keeping the firm together as a going
concern, will maximize the retained value and the retention of employees. Earlier research on the
78idem.
79Lucian Bebchuk, “Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy” (2000) 44 European Economic Review 829.
80See, e.g., Stuart Gilson, “Management Turnover and Financial Distress” (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 241;
Stuart Gilson, “Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms” (1997) 52 The
Journal of Finance 161.
81John Graham et al., “Human Capital Loss in Corporate Bankruptcy” (1 July 2013). US Census Bureau Center for Economic
Studies Paper No. CES-WP-13-37, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2304298>.
82Bidisha Das and Mukulesh Baruah, “Employee Retention: A Review of Literature” (2013) 14 Journal of Business and
Management 8.
83idem.
84Tollenaar, above note 10.
85Sutton and Callahan, above note 56; Aalbers and Dolfsma, above note 32.
86Edward Altman, “A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question” (1984) 39 The Journal of Finance
589; Alexander Robichek and Stewart Myers, “Conceptual Problems in the Use of Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates” (1966)
21 The Journal of Finance 727.
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Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy practice also focused on approximating employee retention. In some
cases, this was limited to cases pending in a limited number of years (2012–2014) or without com-
paring it to the employee retention with a conventional bankruptcy.87 Yet this research indicated that,
compared with conventional bankruptcies, pre-packaged bankruptcy may bring about higher
employee retention.88 This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: Distressed firms that file for pre-packed bankruptcy have higher employee retention rates than
firms that file for a conventional proceeding.
2.4 | Financial distress severity and employee retention
Firms in financial distress tend to have little resource slack, limiting the possibilities for a firm to
invest and regain profitability and reducing the array of real options to consider. The availability of
these resources, however limited, can provide comfort as they are directly related to the ability to
meet financial obligations; employees' wages being one of the most important. As Arogyaswamy
et al. argue, the scope of decline-stemming strategy is a function of the severity of performance
decline and the availability of slack resources.89 Financial approaches to organizational decline such
as the bankruptcy prediction models developed by Altman, by Ohlson, and by Zmijewksi can be
indicative of organizational slack and resource availability.90 The lower the chance of the probability
of bankruptcy predicted by these models, the greater the (financial) slack resources can be expected
within a firm. This availability of resources translates into the possibility to retain employees and to
keep the value-creating activities of the firm intact, making it more attractive for investors to restart
the business after bankruptcy has been declared. However, once poor performance has set in, it tends
to become self-reinforcing; the poor performance depletes the firm's last available resources, which
in turn further negatively affects performance making definitive failure more imminent.91 Indeed,
research has shown that possessing a greater available resource base increases the likelihood of a firm
restructuring in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings and emerging as an independent firm.92 Thus,
reflecting on the financial stress severity of an insolvent firm as it faces bankruptcy, we formulated
the following hypothesis:
H2: Firms with greater (financial) slack resources before bankruptcy show higher employment
retention rates postbankruptcy.
87Jordy Hurenkamp, De Pre-Pack in de Praktijk (Celsus, 2014); van Zanten, above note 15; van den Bosch, above note 17.
88van den Bosch, above note 17.
89Kamala Arogyaswamy, Vincent Barker and Masoud Yasai-Ardekani, “Firm Turnarounds: An Integrative Two-Stage Model”
(1995) 32 Journal of Management Studies 493.
90Edward Altman, “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy” (1968) 23 The
Journal of Finance 589; James Ohlson, “Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy” (1980) 18 Journal of
Accounting Research 109; Mark Zmijewski, “Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial Distress Prediction
Models” (1984) 22 Journal of Accounting Research 59.
91Hambrick and D'Aveni, above note 8.
92Diane Denis and Kimberly Rodgers, “Chapter 11: Duration, Outcome, and Post-Reorganization Performance” (2007)
42 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 101. Note: their findings are primarily related to the absolute size of a
distressed firm.
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3 | RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 | Data collection procedure
We gathered a sample of 225 Dutch firms over the period 2012–2018 (see Appendix A). The firms
in the sample satisfy the following criteria: (a) they filed for bankruptcy between 2012 and 2018 in
the Netherlands, (b) financial and employment data were available either from publicly available
bankruptcy reports, the Orbis database, or from national/regional media,93 and (c) the emerging
(new) firm had been operational for at least 1 year postbankruptcy.94 Data were collected from 2012
when the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy practice emerged.95 Up until the decision of the CJEU on
22 June 2017 in the Smallsteps case,96 the absence of regular legal protection for employees, as rele-
vant for the comparison in this study, was generally considered to be similar in both pre-packed and
conventional bankruptcies. To identify which bankruptcies could be qualified as pre-packs, several
sources were consulted: legal literature, media coverage in LexisNexis database. Those identified
were limited to bankruptcies filed with a Dutch court that accepts the pre-packed bankruptcy practice.
A bankruptcy filing was categorized as a “pre-packed bankruptcy” if the firm itself—as the debtor—
had requested appointment of a provisional liquidator and had concluded the pre-packed bankruptcy
with a (partial) sale of the business upon being declared bankrupt. The sample of conventional bank-
rupt firms was compiled by analysing media coverage on business restarts in the LexisNexis database
and online media coverage. Of the 225 firms, 51 were classified as a pre-packed bankruptcy97 and
174 as conventional bankruptcies. However, nine firms were excluded from the analysis, six (all con-
ventional bankrupts) had no employees before and after the bankruptcy and three were statistically
identified as outliers in terms of size, making the final sample a total of 216 bankruptcies (50 pre-
packed and 166 conventional).
3.2 | Measurement
3.2.1 | Dependent variable
We used employment retention for the key variable of interest, the outcome variable. Employee
retention refers to the ability of any organization to retain employees.98 It was operationalized by
measuring the number of employees before and after the bankruptcy event. To account for the long-
term effects of a bankruptcy and to only measure its direct and isolated impact, the measurements
took place directly before filing for bankruptcy and directly after the restart of the firm's activities in
a new legal entity. This provided a ratio variable, measured as a ratio of the number of employees
before and after the bankruptcy event.
93Collecting these data from multiple sources without the possibility of cross-validation increased the risk of inaccuracies. We
used a constant protocol regarding the reliability of the sources. Bankruptcy reports were assumed to be the most accurate as
they were the last reporting documents produced and published for a firm; second came the Orbis Database, using the most
recent data on the firm if available.
94This third criterion was used to exclude temporary “closing down sale” businesses. These businesses purchase the bankrupt
firm's stockpile at a discount in order to sell this within a short period of time after bankruptcy declaration. The bankrupt firm's
business is only partially restarted for the purpose of this sale period. There is no real employment retention because the firm
closes down after the stockpile has been sold.
95Tollenaar, above note 10. In this article, he advocated for the Dutch courts to adopt pre-packs.
96Court of Justice of the European Union 22 June 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:489 (FNV/Smallsteps).
97Because pre-packed bankruptcy practice was established quite recently in the Netherlands, data availability was limited.
98Das and Baruah, above note 81.
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3.2.2 | Independent variables
We created two predictor variables: “Type of Bankruptcy” and “Severity of Financial Distress.” The
predictor “Type of Bankruptcy” was a binary (0/1) categorical variable. The values were based on
information from the bankruptcy reports. If a bankruptcy was executed after the appointment of a
provisional liquidator, the event was categorized as a pre-packed bankruptcy (code = 1). If there was
no involvement of a provisional liquidator, but the firm managed to restart in a bankruptcy, the event
was categorized as a conventional bankruptcy (code = 0). The predictor “Severity of Financial Dis-
tress” was a continuous variable constructed by calculating the accounting-based Zmijewski score99:
P X0 = 1ð Þ= 11+ exp − Ið Þ ,
with the following discriminant coefficients:
I = −4,336−4,513*X1 + 5,679*X2−0,004*X3,
where I =Overall index,X1 = Net IncomeTotal Assets ,X2 =
Total Liabilities
Total Assets ,andX3 =
Current Assets
Current Liabilities.
The Zmijewski model generated a probability between 0 and 1. A higher value indicated a greater
probability of filing for bankruptcy than a lower value, thereby providing an indicator of the severity
of the financial condition. The probability of bankruptcy 2 years prior to bankruptcy was thus used
as an indicator of the severity of financial distress a priori.
3.2.3 | Control variables
Three covariates were included to control for firm size, industry employment trend, and industry
GDP growth. First, we operationalized “firm size” as the total assets 2 years before the filing event.
Moulton and Thomas explain that “firm size dominates all other factors in predicting success in com-
pleting the reorganisation process.”100 That is, larger firms have greater assets, greater credibility in
the financial markets, and longer term contracts and, therefore, can delay the onset of liquidation
bankruptcy well beyond the point to which smaller firms can. This relationship between resource
availability and the likelihood of failure has also been referred to as “the liability of smallness.”101
Firm size is frequently a check-feature in bankruptcy studies, such as those by Daily and Dalton,
Denis and Rodgers, and Hotchkiss.102 It has been found to be positively related to the probability of
99As most of the firms were privately held limited companies (i.e., “Besloten Vennootschap”), no market data were available
and thus an accounting-based approach was chosen. Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), and Zmijewski (1984) are the most
commonly used approaches. Wu et al. show that the respective accuracies lie close to each other; 86.1% (Altman), 88.7%
(Ohlson), and 85.2% (Zmijewski). Grice and Ingram, also Grice and Dugan, found similar results. See Altman, above note 89;
John Grice and Michael Dugan, “Re-estimations of the Zmijewski and Ohlson bankruptcy prediction models” (2003)
20 Advances in Accounting 77; John Grice and Robert Ingram, “Tests of the Generalizability of Altman's Bankruptcy
Prediction Model” (2001) 54 Journal of Business Research 53; Ohlson, above note 89; Y. Wu, Clive Gaunt and Stephen Gray,
“A Comparison of Alternative Bankruptcy Prediction Models” (2010) 6 Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
34; Zmijewski, above note 89.
100Moulton and Thomas, above note 6.
101See, e.g., Joel Baum and Christine Oliver, “Institutional Linkages and Organizational Mortality” (1991) 36 Administrative
Science Quarterly 187; Jacques Delacroix and Anand Swaminathan, “Cosmetic, Speculative, and Adaptive Organizational
Change in the Wine Industry: A Longitudinal Study” (1991) 36 Administrative Science Quarterly 631.
102Daily and Dalton, above note 65; Denis and Rodgers, above note 91; Edith Hotchkiss, “Postbankruptcy Performance and
Management Turnover” (1995) 50 The Journal of Finance 3.
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emerging as a reorganized entity.103 Inclusion of the firm's asset size as a control variable served to
capture variance associated with this well-reported effect, in order to improve our ability to predict
postbankruptcy employment retention. Second, we looked for employment developments in the
firms' respective industries. The industry employment trend was measured as the average change of
employment in the industry portfolio in the year before and the year of the bankruptcy event. As
Hotchkiss suggests, industry-related problems can be important to performance prior to bankruptcy
and, subsequently, to employment retention.104 This measure specifically controlled for macroeco-
nomic trends for each specific industry.105 Third, to specifically determine macroeconomic character-
istics that could influence employment retention, the annual GDP growth rate was added to the
regression model. Higher annual GDP growth rates in the Netherlands indicate better macroeconomic
circumstances for firms and could have a positive influence on employment retention rates as the
entrepreneurial climate is better. The GDP data were obtained from the World Bank.106
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Descriptive statistics
During data analysis, we observed that the mean employee retention postbankruptcy of the conventional
bankruptcies was 34.6% whereas that of pre-packed bankruptcies was 54.1%. Prebankruptcy employee
numbers differed strongly; on average, 92.51 employees were involved in conventional bankruptcies
and 260.34 in pre-packed bankruptcies. We found less differences for the severity of the financial dis-
tress, that is, the mean Zmijewski score was 0.76 for conventional and 0.79 for pre-packed bankruptcies,
but the difference, −0.02, BCa 95% CI [−0.09, 0.05], was not significant t(214) = −0.640, p = .523.
With regard to firm size, conventional bankruptcies on average held EUR 15,390,312 in assets (SD =
59,681,585; Min. = EUR 5,986; Max. = EUR 670,021,700), pre-packs EUR 39,113,377 (SD =
95,666,751; Min. = EUR 242,835; Max. = EUR 576,469,000). This difference, −EUR 23,723,065,
BCa 95% CI [−EUR 52,319,190, EUR 4,873,059], was also not significant t(214) = −1.659, p = .102.
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the total sample are presented in Table A1.
4.2 | Multiple regression
Table A2 presents the four different multiple regression analyses. In Model 1, we tested the baseline
model containing the control variables only. None of the covariates had a significant effect on employ-
ment retention. That is, the size of the firm, the industry employee trend, and the annual GDP growth
rates did not have an effect on employee retention postbankruptcy. In Models 2 and 3, we separately
introduced the two predictor variables to measure their respective effect on employment retention.
103Marcel Naujoks, Restructuring Strategies and Post-Bankruptcy Performance (Technische Universität München, 2012).
104Hotchkiss, above note 101.
105To analyse these trends, the control variable was constructed for the following industry categories based on NACE-codes
and CBS employment data: (a) manufacturing, (b) construction, (c) wholesale and retail trade, (d) transporting and storage,
(e) accommodation, (f????????) information and communication, (g) financial and insurance activities, (h) professional,
scientific, and technical activities, (i) administrative and support service activities, (j) human health and social work activities,
and (k) other services activities. See CBS Statline, Labor and labor market, Jobs, SBI2008 & Regions, available at:<http://
statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=83582NED&VW=T>.
106The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2017). Annual GDP Growth, Atlas Method [Data file], available at:
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2015&locations=NL&name_desc=false&start=2012&
view=map&year=2015>.
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Model 2 presents the isolated effect of financial distress against the background of the baseline model.
As the results indicate, there was no significant effect on employment retention (B = 0.07, p = .485).
Model 3 shows that type of bankruptcy had a positive significant effect on employment retention when
entered into the baseline model in isolation (B = 0.16, p = .007). This result indicates that when type of
bankruptcy changes from conventional (0) to pre-packed (1), employment retention (i.e., the ratio of
the number of employees before and after the bankruptcy) increased by 0.157 percentage points. Model
4 gives the effect of the two predictors, put together in one model, together with the three covariates.
Type of Bankruptcy had a significant effect on employee retention (B = 0.16, p = .008). The severity
of financial distress did not impact employment retention (B = 0.05, p = .611), as did firm size (B =
0.00, p = .124), industry employee trend (B = −1.94, p = .250), and annual GDP growth rate (B =
−0.54, p = .488). Therefore, H1 is supported: a pre-packed bankruptcy positively influences employ-
ment retention postbankruptcy, but H2 is not supported: firms with greater (financial) resource slack
before bankruptcy do not show higher employment retention rates postbankruptcy.107
5 | DISCUSSION
With this article, we set out to contribute to a discussion on bankruptcy procedures as a mechanism
for strategic change, and the type of bankruptcy proceeding that best serves that change. Utilizing
official court data of Dutch bankruptcies in the period 2012–2018, we analysed which proceedings
were more efficient in preserving value for employees in terms of employment retention. On the one
hand, the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy proceeding provides for a preliminary phase before filing for
bankruptcy, which sets it apart from the conventional bankruptcy proceedings available under Dutch
law. This usually confidential preliminary phase allows the debtor's management to be in control of
preparing the postbankruptcy going-concern sale. Whereas a provisional liquidator and provisional
supervisory judge are involved, they have no formal powers phase. On the other hand, conventional
bankruptcy proceedings do not permit such confidentiality. Moreover, the management is displaced
by the liquidator who is in charge in pursuing a going-concern sale. Until the judgement of the CJEU
in the Smallsteps case in June 2017, it was considered that—different from the United Kingdom—in
the nonstatutory Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy, employees would not be automatically transferred to
the transferee that takes over the business. This context was the basis for our study focusing on
aspects of efficiency of the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy proceeding that may assist in policymaking
on efficiency of restructuring driven legal frameworks on restructuring and insolvency.
Drawing from real options theory and debt overhang theory, we argued that strategic bankruptcy
limits bankruptcy costs, causes less value destruction in bankruptcy, and subsequently preserves a
higher ratio of employees, postbankruptcy.108 Based on a specific sample of 216 Dutch pre-packed and
conventional bankruptcy cases, in which a strategic filing for bankruptcy was used as a mechanism to
restructure the firm so that it subsequently emerged as a going concern, we found that pre-packed bank-
ruptcy proceedings—compared with conventional bankruptcy proceedings—best serve employment
retention rates postbankruptcy. This finding takes the amount of resource slack into account, as well as
the differences in firm size, industry employment trend, and annual GDP growth rate.
Interestingly, we found that the severity of financial distress before bankruptcy did not affect
employment retention. Thus, despite the amount of (financial) resource slack, the preservation of
107As a robustness check to this finding, an additional Robust Covariance Matrix Estimation analysis was completed that
revealed that the severity of financial distress prebankruptcy holds a marginal and insignificant effect on employment retention
rate postbankruptcy. Results are available upon request.
108See, e.g., Giroud et al., above note 33; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, above note 33; Myers, above note 33.
AALBERS ET AL.336
employee value is better served under a pre-packed bankruptcy. This finding is important for insol-
vency practice, as up to 22 June 2017, employee rights in the Netherlands (including redundancy)
were generally considered not to be automatically transferred to the new firm in a pre-packed bank-
ruptcy. In other words, the financial burden of employees before a bankruptcy proceeding was inde-
pendent of the bankruptcy type. This suggests that strategic bankruptcy can be beneficial to
employment retention regardless of the financial distress. Similarly, whereas larger firms (in terms of
absolute number of employees) may face extra scrutiny from media and trade unions, this does not
seem to affect employment retention postbankruptcy.
5.1 | Implications for insolvency regulation and practice
This empirical study centres around the specific characteristics of the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy.
This bankruptcy tool sets itself apart from, for instance, the U.K. pre-pack, by providing comparably
less protection for employees by applying the exception of Article 5(1) of the TOU Directive. The
liquidator plays differing roles: in pre-packed bankruptcy proceedings, the provisional liquidator has
no formal powers in the preliminary phase, in contrast to those of the liquidator in conventional
bankruptcy proceedings. Instead, it allows more room for the insolvent debtor and the acquirer of the
debtor's assets to seek a solution for the distressed business. The Smallsteps case significantly
impacted restructuring tools such as the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy, leading to fewer pre-packs in
recent years. The approach to the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy in that case was ruled to violate the
employee protection provided for in the TOU Directive. In this study, we show that the Dutch pre-
packaged bankruptcies provide higher employee retention rates compared with conventional bank-
ruptcies. These results are in line with and expand on previous studies on Dutch pre-packs.
Our results suggest that the Dutch pre-packed bankruptcy better protects an employee's interest of
maintaining employment, compared with going-concern sales in conventional bankruptcy. Notably,
this is the case despite that the TOU Directive—explicitly promoting protection of acquired rights by
employees—was considered not applicable. Furthermore, the scope of formal powers and involve-
ment of the provisional liquidator for pre-packed bankruptcy is significantly limited compared with
the liquidator in conventional bankruptcy proceedings. Whereas the debtor's management is neither
tasked with maximizing value for the body of creditors nor considering employee retention in their
strategic use of bankruptcy proceedings to pursue continuation of the business; still, the debtor-
driven pre-packed bankruptcy results in higher employee retention than going-concern sales pursued
by a liquidator in conventional bankruptcy. This is also an indication that—in the Dutch context in
absence of an effective formal and hybrid restructuring proceedings—governance over a firm in
insolvency by a debtor's management—instead of a liquidator—can be beneficial to the employees
in case continuation of the business is pursued. This is in line with real option theory, suggesting that
the firm's management aim for the strategic bankruptcy option that will result in the most beneficial
alternative to successfully continue the business in a new legal entity.
The relevance of employees in insolvency has also prompted outside the context of formal bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In recent years, both Dutch and EU legislators have been involved in legislative
efforts focusing on promoting the restructuring of financially distressed but economically viable busi-
nesses. A core policy goal in these efforts is to devise legal frameworks that are conducive to
“preventing their insolvency, and therefore maximising the total value to creditors, employees,
owners and the economy as a whole.”109 The importance of this aim was reiterated recently when the
109Commission Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, 12 March 2014, C(2014) 1500 final,
recital 1 and at 1.
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EU Directive on restructuring and insolvency was adopted stating: “In restructuring frameworks the
rights of all parties involved, including workers, should be protected in a balanced manner.”110 The
Dutch legislator decided that in its recent bill on a Dutch Act on Court Confirmation of Extrajudicial
Restructuring Plans (“WHOA”),111 a proposal aligned to the aforementioned Directive, employees
were to be excluded from its scope. These legislative efforts, although geared towards preventive res-
tructuring, seem reluctant to deal with matters affecting employee rights. However, for legislative
purposes, our results elevate the question whether current policy and legislation relating to employee
rights in restructuring is de facto effectively protecting employee interests. Although only accounting
for the impact on employee retention, contrary to current policymaking, our empirical analysis high-
lights that employees can benefit from flexibility and that flexibility thus can support policy goals.
These insights also suggest that legislators, policymakers, and stakeholders involved in legislative
processes may benefit from considering further empirical studies to better understand the effects of
the network externalities of existing legal frameworks on employees.
5.2 | Limitations
Although our study was carefully designed with regard to methodology and theoretical consider-
ations, limitations are inevitable. The first limitation is dogmatic: for the purpose of this study, should
a filing for a bankruptcy proceeding always be considered “strategic” in case a debtor's business con-
tinues following a (partial) sale of assets for at least 1 year postbankruptcy? Although we considered
such bankruptcy proceedings to be strategic, there may be exceptions. On the one hand, a pre-packed
bankruptcy may not always be well planned by the debtor, and on the other hand, a restart in a con-
ventional bankruptcy may also have resulted from actions of the liquidator that were unforeseen
when the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Second, the analysis focused on the period of 1 year after bank-
ruptcy. Future studies should analyse the effects over a longer period, to confirm if the results hold in
the longer term postbankruptcy. Third, following the CJEU judgement in Smallsteps, the employee
protection provided in the TOU Directive is, in principle, considered applicable to the Dutch pre-
packed bankruptcy. This new state of play and its impact on employee retention fall outside the
scope of this study. A new study may provide empirical insights into whether application of the
TOU Directive contributes (or not) to employee retention, in comparison with the approach pursued
in the Netherlands before June 2017. Fourth, this study has been limited to the Dutch setting and on
the specific impact of two restructuring-driven bankruptcy scenarios on employee retention. Further
research may extend the impact on the interests of employees, for example, by expanding this study
to comparing strategic bankruptcy in different jurisdictions and by measuring additional features of
employees' interest such as salary, fixed/nonfixed contracts, and other working conditions.
109Commission Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, 12 March 2014, C(2014) 1500 final,
recital 1 and at 1.
110Directive EU 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring
frameworks, on discharge of debt and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures concerning
restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132, recital 3.
111Kamerstukken II 2018/19, 35249, nr. 2 (Wetsvoorstel Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord), available at: <https://zoek.
officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-35249-2.html>.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Employee retention 0.39 0.35
2. Type of bankruptcy — — 0.26***
3. Severity of financial
distress
0.77 0.26 0.01 −0.04
4. Size 20,881,762 70,142,441 0.15* 0.24*** −0.21**
5. Industry employment
trend
−0.001 0.018 −0.19** −0.16* 0.08 −0.20**
6. Annual GDP growth 0.02 0.04 −0.19** −0.34*** 0.04 −0.16* 0.63***




TABLE A2 Multiple regression results for postbankruptcy employee retention
Dependent variable
(employee retention) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept .397*** (0.030) .345*** (0.081) .196* (0.079) .162 (0.105)
Independent variables
Type of bankruptcy .157** (0.058) .155** (0.058)
Severity of financial distress .066 (0.095) .048 (0.094)
Control variables
Size .000 (0.000) .000† (0.000) .000 (0.000) .000 (0.000)
Industry employment trend −1.866 (1.706) −1.909 (1.710) −1.914 (1.681) −1.944 (1.685)
Annual GDP growth −.970 (0.775) −.963 (0.776) −.541 (0.779) −.542 (0.781)
R2 .054 .056 .086 .087
Adjusted R2 .040 .038 .069 .066
F 4.018** 3.128* 4.973** 4.016**
Sig. .008 .016 .001 .002
Note. Bootstrapping (BCa) = 5,000. Standard error in parentheses. N = 216.
*p < .05.; **p < .01.; ***p < .001.; †p < .10.
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